工程管理 畢業(yè)設計招標文件 外文翻譯 中英文：分包和不完全競爭性招標

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1、寧波工程學院畢業(yè)設計（論文）—外文翻譯 外文原文2： Subcontracting and Competitive Bidding on Incomplete Procurement Contracts Daniel P. Miller

2、 University of Minnesota Job Market Paper November 12, 2008 Abstract This paper investigates the cost implications of contractual incompleteness and itse ect

3、on subcontracting decisions in the bridge construction industry. Construction contracts are incomplete because the original blueprints and specications may require modications during construction. According to the transactions cost theory of the rm|Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)|such contract revis

4、ions can lead to signicant bargaining and renegotiation costs. Furthermore, theory predicts these costs are larger if a subcontractor performs the work. Forward looking contractors anticipate these costs and incorporate them in their bids. I develop an empirical framework to quantify the impact of i

5、ncompleteness on cost for both integrated and non-integrated transactions and apply it to 32 bridge contracts procured by the California Depart-ment of Transportation. Contracts contain many work items (e.g. casting concrete,drilling, trac striping). For each item, contractors decide whether to perf

6、orm work themselves or hire a subcontractor and submit a bid. The di erence between the work item quantity in the original contract and the quantity actually installed after revi-sions proxies for incompleteness. In estimation, I account for the strategic aspects of bidding to recover cost from bids

7、 and exploit the panel data structure to account for the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. On average, incompleteness explains a small portion of cost, 2%, for integrated transactions and a large portion, 13%, for non-integrated transactions. The results provide quantitative evidence in suppo

8、rt of in-complete contracting theories of the rm and have practical signicance for evaluating procurement practices. 1 Introduction Subcontractors play a vital role in the construction industry. They perform 50% of the work on civil projects and 75% to 100% on a typical private construction p

9、roject.1But, the contractualhazards of subcontracting plague the industry. Sweet (2004), an expert on the legal aspects of construction contracting, expresses this sentiment by titling his chapter on subcontracting The Achilles Heel of Construction Management." The hazards he refers to usually invol

10、ve contract changes, and the costs manifest in many ways. On a small scale, changes disrupt day-to-day construction operations, but they can also lead to very costly outcomes such as arbitration and litigation. Semple et al. (1994) finds the average claim in their sample delays construction by 60% o

11、f the contract duration and comes with a cost equal to the value of the original contract. Stories of subcontract misgovernance frequently reach headlines. An example is Bostons notorious Big Dig" which required drastic changes in construction plans. Construction projects begin with the prepara

12、tion of plans, specications, and blueprints. For reasons largely unpredictable and out of the control of both buyers and contractors, modications and revisions will be made.3Such changes require contractors and their subcontractors to adapt the construction process without direction from a prior wri

13、tten contract. This is the sense in which construction contracts are incomplete. According to incomplete contracting theories of therm(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985)frictions in the bargaining and renegotiation process that accompanies a contract change generate ex-post adaptation costs. Theory pred

14、icts these costs are higher when the process involves subcontractors. These cost considerations in uence contractors decisions to hire subcontractors, or|using the term coined in the literature, their \make or buy"decisions.In the public sector, construction projects are typically procured using com

15、petitive bidding. The most common contracting format is called design-bid-build. First, the buyers engineers prepare specications and blueprints. Then contractors bid in a competitive auction and the low bidder is hired to build the project. These contracts abide by the principle of forward pricin

16、g; bids submitted ex-ante, not costs incurred ex-post, establish the terms of compensation. Primary contractors, who submit bids, and the subcontractors they hire are liable for all costs. Consequently, forward looking, rational contractors will assess the likelihood that design changes will occur a

17、nd incorporate anticipated adaptation costs into their bids. I develop a model representation of the design-bid-build process and propose a measure of con-tractual incompleteness to address four quantitative questions. What is the eect of incompleteness on cost if a subcontractor performs work?

18、 What is the e ect if a primary contractor performs work?Do these eects dier? Finally, what are the dollar-valued magnitudes? The baseline prediction is that cost increases in the degree of incompleteness under both arrangements, but with a larger marginal eect for work performed by a subcontractor.

19、 I apply the framework to bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). A vast body of empirical work qualitatively analyzes how rms are organized. These traditional studies, lacking cost measures, only address the third question listed above: does incomple

20、teness(or some other parameter) a ect the probability of subcontracting? There is very little quantitativeevidence about the impact of rm boundaries on economic outcomes such as cost. This has been a major critique in this literature (Hubbard, 2008; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007; Klein, 2005). This pap

21、er o ers one of the rst attempts to bring the missing data, examine the cost primitives of the theory, and, stated bluntly, to show that rm boundaries matter. Such a research design is made possible because bids reect cost. The main nding is that incompleteness has a negligible eect on cost for work

22、 performed by a prime contractor. The eect is large for subcontracting;incompleteness accounts for 13% of cost. The unit of analysis is at a detailed level. The engineers speci cations list construction work items and corresponding quantities. On bridge contracts, tasks range from heavy enginee

23、ring jobs such as installing structural concrete, steel, asphalt, and drilling to ancillary tasks such as trac striping, fencing, and landscaping. For each task, bidders decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor. They also submit a unit price bid expressed as dollars per unit

24、 of quantity. Unit price bids are aggregated according to a scoring rule to determine the low bidder. Incompleteness is inherently a di cult concept to measure. A measurement should capture contractors beliefs about the non-contracted contingencies that might occur during the ex-post build phas

25、e. Many contingencies alter blueprints, which, in turn, requires an adjustment in quan-tities actually installed. I propose a measure based on quantity changes. Specically, the dierence between the work item quantity in the original blueprints and the quantity actually installed af-ter blueprint rev

26、isions proxies for incompleteness. Those tasks that experience little or no change were likely perceived by contractors to have a low degree of incompleteness while those with large changes a high degree of incompleteness. This is an exogenous measure because contractors have little ability, ex-ante

27、 and ex-post, to in uence installed quantities. Quantities change because of3external circumstances. Bidding and subcontracting decisions depend on incompleteness. I do not explicitly model the mechanics of the ex-post bargaining process; nor do I model any other ex-ante actions taken in antici

28、pation of bargaining. Instead, I treat the predictions of theory in a reduced form manner and use the model to show why the incompleteness proxy a ects forecasted unit costs and thesubsequent subcontracting decision.In a subgame, I model subcontract formation.I model the strategic aspects of b

29、idding which also depend on quantity changes. These are scoring auctions. The total bid is calculated by multiplying unit price bids with original quantities,then summing those values across tasks. For each task, the winner is paid its unit price bid times the quantity actually installed. Di erences

30、 in original and nal quantities induce strategic bidding behavior. The basic intuition described by Athey and Levin (2001) shows that bidders skew unit price bids above cost on tasks expected to overrun on quantity and below cost on tasks expected to underrun. By skewing, a bidder earns a higher pro

31、t without a ecting its total bidand hence probability of winning the contract. Bid skewing is risky. If the overrun (or, for thatmatter underrun) does not occur, the winning bidder suers a lose. The principles for allocating unit price bids are analogous to concepts from modern portfolio theory (Mar

32、kowitz, 1952). The specic modeling choices match industry practitioners intuition about unit price bidding. They credit these ideas to Gates (1959). I apply results from the scoring auction literature to formallycharacterize equilibrium bidding behavior (Asker and Cantillon, 2008). The model co

33、llapses to a linear econometric specication. A unit price bid is the dependent vari-able and the proxy for incompleteness is the key explanatory variable. There are two potentially confounding factors: bid skewing and the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. Bid-skewing terms derived from the au

34、ction model enter linearly. To account for the endogeneity of subcon- tracting decisions, I use a xed eect method which exploits the unique panel data structure. I see multiple observations of very similar transactions. For example, within a project there are multiple bidders, and across projects, t

35、he same set of construction tasks. Finally, I add exibility by making a distinction between heavy construction tasks and ancillary tasks. The predominant view in the industry is that prime contractors lack core competencies and a minimum e cient scale on ancillary tasks. I will argue that it is amb

36、iguous whether the e ect of incompleteness on subcontracting costs should be hypothesized to be greater than that for prime-contracting. (I invent the word primecontracting" for a dichotomy with the term subcontracting. Primecontracting means the prime contractor elects to perform work ) 1.1 Cont

37、ribution to Existing Literature This study joins an emerging literature that quantities the impact of rm boundaries on economic outcomes. Recent examples include Gil (2008) (industry: cinemas and performance outcome: movie run length), Ciliberto (2006) (hospitals and capital investments), Forbes an

38、d Lederman (2007)(airlines and ight delays), and Novak and Stern (2008) (automobiles and consumer quality ratings).Others Baker and Hubbard (2004) (trucking and fuel economy) and Levin and Tadelis (2008)(municipal services and city expenditures)consider but do not focus on performance outcomes.

39、 I adopt a more structural approach than most work in this literature by analyzing an auction setting. The timing of bid submissions provides a crisp division between ex-ante contract formation(design and bid) and ex-post contract execution (build). This means bids capture all costs of both ex-anted

40、 incentive distortions and ex-post bargaining. Whereas many of the previous studies consider intermediate outcomes that partially related to the pro tability objectives of rms, bids fully encapsulate contractors objectives. They choose organizational arrangements that minimi zecost.5The challenge in

41、 conducting an performance based make or buy" study is to account for endogeneity in subcontracting decisions. The panel data structures provides controls. This study of contractual incompleteness falls into the class of empirical work that considers uncertainty and complexity of a transaction.

42、 Seminal contributions include Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten (1984) and Masten et al. (1991). They nd a higher degree of complexity is asso-ciated with a lower probability of subcontracting. Recent work by Gil (2007) (movies), Acemoglu,Aghion, Grith, and Zilibotti (2007) (R&D intesity), Forbes

43、 and Lederman (2006) (airlines) Levinand Tadelis (2008) (municipal services) obtain the same result. The literature on forward integra-tion into retailing nds mixed evidence.6 Williamson (1985) and, in particular, his earlier work Williamson (1975), identied uncertainty as one of the key determinant

44、s of rm boundaries for empirical researchers to take to the data.7This factor is losing favor, in part, because of the dif-culty of measuring uncertainty. Typically, studies rely on survey data of industry practitioners or measures of market volatility. Uncertainty is notoriously measured with error

45、. This creates severe attenuation bias that leads to statistically insignicant estimates.A strength of this study is that the proxy captures a precise notion of incompleteness: changes in the construction contract measured at the detailed level of a work item transaction. Besides providing evid

46、ence about theory, this study has practical signicance. Public procure-ment agencies emphasize the competitive aspects of contracting. They try to promote competition with the goal of reducing bidder markups. Markup estimates are small, around 4%.9This suggeststhere are negligible gains available

47、from promoting further competition. Instead, eorts to write more complete construction plans could generate signi cant cost savings|up to 17% for the trans-actions most sensitive to incompleteness. Moreover, the civil engineering industry is important to study given the urgency to replace and repair

48、 \structurally de cient" public infrastructure. The Federal Highway Administration projects the need for an annual spending increase on bridges from $5 billion to $40 billion. In the conclusion, I o er a more in-depth analysis and motivate ideas for policy research. This work is related to the

49、empirical auctions literature. There is an especially large body of work on highway procurement auctions including the contributions of Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Krasnokutskaya (2004), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2007), Marion (2008), De Sil

50、va et al. (2008), and Bajari and Lewis (2008). This is the rst study to use work items as the unit of observation within the context of a structural auction model.10 Previous empirical work on bid skewing (Athey and Levin, 2001; Bajari et al., 2007) restricted attention to just one dimension of

51、 skewing. I model the bid skewing decision as a portfolio choice problem. That is, the correlation structure in quantity change risk across all tasks determines the optimal skew on any given task. The proposed empirical technique recovers the correlation structure of risk. Risk aversion in auctions

52、has attracted attention in both the empirical auctions and experimental economics literature.11 Adapting the method could provide eld evidence on Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coe cients with large amounts of money at a stake. In summary, this study o ers four contributions. First, I quantity, rath

53、er than qualitatively assess, the e ects of incompleteness and integration decisions on cost. The second contribution regards the quality of the data. I perform analysis at the detailed level of a work item. The sample includes over 12,000 individual transactions. I propose a well de ned notion of i

54、ncompleteness,and the unique panel data structures provides controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Third, the cost implications have signicance for procurement practices. Fourth, I contribute to the empirical auctions literature by expanding the empirical framework to handle bid skewing.The paper is

55、 organized as follows; section 2 presents a model of the procurement process.Section 3 describes the data; section 4, the estimation procedure. Section 5 presents results.Section 6 discusses robustness; section 7 concludes. 中文翻譯2：

56、 分包和不完全競爭性招標 采購合同 丹尼爾P.米勒 美國明尼蘇達大學 就業(yè)市場的紙 2008年11月12日 文摘 本文研究了成本契約的不完全性及其意義除在橋梁施工分包決定產(chǎn)業(yè)。建設合同

57、是不完整的,因為在施工期間原始設計圖和規(guī)格可能需要修改。根據(jù)交易成本理論-科斯(1937),威廉姆森(1985)|合同的修改會導致顯著的談判，暨南成本 。此外,理論預測這些成本如果分包商執(zhí)行更大的工作。向前看的承包商預期這些成本并將他們投標。我創(chuàng)造了一個實證框架量化在成本上的影響都不整合,非綜合交易并把它應用到32橋招惹加洲合同離開-品德的交通工具。合同中包含許多工作條款(如鑄造混凝土,鉆井、交通分拆涂料)。每個項目,承包商決定是否執(zhí)行操作自己或租一分包商并提交一份報價。不同之間的工作在原合同項目數(shù)量,數(shù)量安裝后——其實殘缺的代表。在估計,我解釋戰(zhàn)略方面招標投標,并恢復成本結構,利用面板數(shù)據(jù)帳

58、戶分包商為擁的決定。平均來說,不完全性解釋一小部分費用,2%,為綜合交易和很大一部分,13%,非綜合交易。研究結果提供定量的證據(jù)支持在-完整的承包和理論具有一定的實際得到評估采購工作. 1介紹 分包商中起著至關重要的作用,在建筑業(yè)。他們執(zhí)行50%的工作土木工程,和75% ~ 100%在一個典型的民營建筑項目1。但是,合同危險的瘟疫工業(yè)。分包商香(2004),這是一個法律方面的專家施工總承包,表現(xiàn)他的情感章關于分包商傾倒了。施工管理的弱點。他指的是“危險通常包括合同變化,表現(xiàn)在許多方面的費用。在一個小的規(guī)模,改變啦。破壞施工操作,但他們也能導致非常昂貴的仲裁和結果等訴訟。丁曉萍。(199

59、4)樣本中平均延誤索賠建設60%合同持續(xù)時間和帶有一個費用等同于原合同的價值。故事轉包經(jīng)常達到的頭條新聞。一個例子是波士頓的臭名昭著的大挖"這要求劇烈變革在建設規(guī)劃2。 建設項目開始準備計劃，規(guī)格,藍圖。為原因很大程度上是不可預知的和無法控制的買家和合同商,修改和修訂。3這樣的變化要求承包商和他們的分包商的適應在施工過程中沒有方向從書面合同。26講解是這樣哪一種施工合同是不完全的。據(jù)不完全合同理論(科斯,1937分;威廉姆森,1985)|中的摩擦過程,本文討價還價伴隨產(chǎn)生適應改變事后合同費用。理論預測這些成本這個過程包括高分包商。這些成本的考慮因素,元代承包商的決定聘用分包商,或|使

60、用術語,在文獻中,他們制造或買”決定。 在公用事業(yè)部門,建設項目通常使用競價收購。這最常見的形式被稱為設計競標建造 承包。首先,買方的工程師們準備規(guī)格和藍圖。然后承包商投標競爭拍賣和低投標人雇傭來建造這個項目。這些合同遵守原則的遠期價格;提交的投標“事前,而不是事后費用,建立條款的補償。主要承包商,遞交投標,分包商應負賠償所有雇用成本。因此,前進看,合理評估承包商的可能性,將設計變化將發(fā)生預期適應成本成為投標 我創(chuàng)造了一個表現(xiàn)的設計競標建造 過程模型,并提出一個衡量反對-合同不完全性來解決四個定量問題。什么是除不完全性的嗎如果分包商在成本上完成工作嗎?什么是除基層承包商完成

61、工作嗎?這些蝕刻動物 嗎?最后,美元值級是什么?基線預測是成本的增加程度的不完全性,無論在安排,但有一個大一點的嗎邊際除工作分包商完成的。我申請這個框架到橋項目收購經(jīng)加州交通部(交通局)。 一個巨大的身體的實證研究分析組織定性有效值。這些傳統(tǒng)的研究中,缺乏成本措施,只能滿足上述第三個問題:難道不完全性(或其他一些參數(shù))的概率轉包合同嗎?很少有數(shù)量的證據(jù)邊界的影響經(jīng)濟的結果,例如成本。這是一個主要的批判中這個文學(哈伯德,2008分;Lafontaine和斯萊德,2007分;克萊恩,2005)。這論文的企圖將缺失數(shù)據(jù),檢驗元素的成本這個理論,并說坦率地講,就是表明rm在邊界問題上。這樣

62、的研究設計你可能因為投標等成本。主要的連接是不可以忽略不計除成本為總承包人進行工作。分包商的除而變大;不完全性占13%的成本。 單位的分析是在一個詳細的水平。工程師的技術規(guī)范名單建設工作項目和相應的數(shù)量。橋上的合同,業(yè)務范圍從繁重的工程工作,如安裝結構混凝土、鋼、瀝青及鉆井配套的任務,例如擊劍、園林綠化。每一件工作,決定是否要完成工作的投標人自己或租一分包商。他們還提交投標單價表示為美元/臺的數(shù)量。單位價格投標聚集根據(jù)低評分規(guī)則確定的承包商得標制造的。 殘缺,也就是概念的措施。應抓住一個測量承包商的信仰有關偶發(fā)事件可能發(fā)生在事后建立階段。許多發(fā)生改變的藍圖,這又反過來需要調(diào)

63、整?！瓕嶋H上安裝。我提出了一種基于數(shù)量衡量的變化。特別地,不同工作項目數(shù)量之間在原圖紙及數(shù)量見-實際上安裝代表“修改不完全性藍圖。那些工作,很少或根本沒有經(jīng)驗的變化可能是察覺到有一個低的承包商的程度的不完全性,而大的改變一個高度的不完全性。這是外生程度上是因為安保人員小能力,“事前和事后,進去的元代安裝的數(shù)量。數(shù)量的改變,因為外部環(huán)境。 招標和分包商決定取決于不完全性。我不明確的模型力學的事后議價過程;我也不模型其他南北火辣期盼已久的討價還價。相反,我對待預測理論的一個簡化的方式并使用模型來說明為什么不單位代理成本和預測隨后的轉包合同的決定。在一個牌,我模型分包的形成

64、我的戰(zhàn)略方面的競價模型也取決于數(shù)量的變化。這是得分拍賣?？傊袠藛蝺r乘以計算與原投標數(shù)量,然后在總結這些價值的任務。每一件工作,支付贏家是它的單價報價倍的數(shù)量其實安裝。在最初的及數(shù)量誘導策略投標行為。描述基本的直覺和萊文校長蘇珊(2001)表明,競拍者投標單位價格高于成本偏差工作將溢出量低于成本和任務預期。偏斜的,投標人贏得總高港沒有報價從而贏得了合約的可能性。投標的偏斜是危險的。(或者,如果超出預算的物質(zhì)underrun)不發(fā)生,中標人suers一個輸。分配的原則單價的出價是類似于現(xiàn)代投資組合理論概念(Markowitz,1952)。這建模選擇火柴工業(yè)從業(yè)者的直覺關于單元競價。他們信用這些觀念

65、蓋茨(1959)。申請結果從文學得分拍賣正式表征的均衡報價行為(邀請和Cantillon,2008)。 該模型線性計量崩塌。中標單價依賴諸多-并代理為不完全性能力是關鍵表達變量。有兩個潛在的混雜致病因素:叫偏斜和擁的分包的決定。術語來源于拍賣模型輸入線性的。占擁的決定,我用一個合為一體的獨特方法,利用除面板數(shù)據(jù)結構。我看到多觀察非常類似的交易。例如,在一個項目內(nèi)有多重投標人,穿越工程,同一套建設任務。 最后,我添加將重型施工任務之間的區(qū)別及配套任務。主要的觀點,主要是缺乏產(chǎn)業(yè)核心競爭力與承包商最小刻度輔助工作。我將認為這是模糊的是否除在分包商不完全性成本應該假設比,總理-收縮。(我

66、發(fā)明了詞”的二分法,術語分包。意味著總承包人選執(zhí)行工作)。 1.1對現(xiàn)有文獻 這是一種新興的研究文獻,加入量的影響經(jīng)濟。晶界的rm結果。最近的例子包括吉爾(2008)(產(chǎn)業(yè):電影院和績效結果:電影運行長度)、Ciliberto(2006)(醫(yī)院和資本投資),《福布斯》和Lederman(2007)(航空公司和飛行延誤),和諾瓦克和船尾(2008)(汽車和消費質(zhì)量等級)。別人|貝克和哈伯德(2004)(卡車和燃油經(jīng)濟性)和李威和Tadelis(2008)(市政服務和城市支出)|考慮但不關注業(yè)績結果。 我采取一種更加結構方法比大多數(shù)的工作在這文學分析拍賣的形式設置。投標文件的時間提供了一個干脆利落的南北分界線訂立合同(設計投標)和事后合同執(zhí)行(建立)。這意味著所有的成本費用投標捕獲兩ex-anted激勵扭曲和事后討價還價。而許多先前的研究考慮中間結果部分相關的目標均方根,投標完全封裝承包商的目標。組織安排,減少他們的選擇成本5。面臨的挑戰(zhàn)進行基于績效\制造或購買”研究說明在分包商外生的決定。提供的控制面板數(shù)據(jù)結構 本研究契約的不完全性掉進了一