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1、Law and Fact in Patent Litigation: Form versus Function* 法律和事實在專利訴訟中是形式還是功能 Thomas G. Field, Jr. Introduction Recently, the Supreme Court sent Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp. back to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). It remanded with explicit directions that the lower court con

2、sider the extent to which Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) governs appellate review of nonobviousness determinations. 介紹： 最近，最高法院駁回了丹尼森Mfg.訴泛達公司的案件至聯(lián)邦巡回法院（CAFC）。它的駁回帶有鮮明的特征，即在考慮了《美國聯(lián)邦民法》第52頁中所規(guī)定的審查基層法院上訴的非顯而易見的程度后才發(fā)回重審。 On remand, the CAFC should attempt to relate the issue to the scope of review for other

3、issues that arise in patent appeals. Neither the narrow nor the broad problem has ever received the attention it deserves — particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental law/fact dichotomy. 在發(fā)回重審時，聯(lián)邦巡回法院應(yīng)該嘗試在專利上訴時聯(lián)系它的復(fù)審范圍。但是無論是狹義還是廣義的問題都沒有得到它應(yīng)有的重視——特別是基本的法律/ 事實二分法上的觀點。 It is by no means cert

4、ain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate for questions of fact under “clearly erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standards. This paper argue

5、s that, if the courts are inclined to persist in more intense review of nonobviousness, two other matters need to be considered: First, whether more liberal review should be extended to all questions concerning patent validity, and, second, whether such review should be conducted under a “constitut

6、ional fact” doctrine. 這絕不是說專利的非顯而易見性裁定應(yīng)作為法律問題來對待。然而，現(xiàn)在有充分證據(jù)說明法院將更嚴格地審查這些帶有明顯錯誤或者充足證據(jù)這么一個層次的審判結(jié)果。本文討論的是，如果法院都傾向于對專利的非顯而易見性堅持更嚴格的審查，則另外兩個問題需要考慮：第一，審查是否應(yīng)當擴大到所有涉及專利的有效性審查，而且，第二，審查是否應(yīng)根據(jù)“憲制上的事實”原則來進行。 The former would address apparent inconsistencies in the current law, and the latter would allow appell

7、ate courts an expanded role (function) without unduly confusing terminology (form). 前者將解決現(xiàn)行法律明顯不一致，而后者則允許上訴法院的一個更大的作用（功能），而不會出現(xiàn)過度混亂的專業(yè)術(shù)語（形式）。 The Law/Fact Dichotomy 法律/事實二分理論 The most directly relevant precedent governing appellate review of patent litigation is cryptic. Quoted in the per curiam

8、 decision that remands Dennison, It consists of one sentence from the Court’s decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.: “While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, ... the 103 condition... lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.” 最直接相關(guān)的專利訴訟的先例中的上訴審查是比較模糊的。引述一則依法院決定將Denniso

9、n案發(fā)回重審的案例，法院對Graham v. John Deere Co.的決定中的有這么一句話：“雖然專利的有效性問題最終都是法律問題，... 第103項條件...隨后又詢問了幾個基本的事實?！? However, what that sentence means is unclear; Graham indicated neither reasons nor authority for denominating questions of patent validity, in general, or nonobviousness, specifically, as ones of “

10、law” (as contrasted with “fact”). As shown below, without an analysis of those matters, it is very difficult to determine either whether validity issues other than nonobviousness should be treated as ones of “l(fā)aw” or, in any case, what sort of treatment should be afforded. It is hoped that, followin

11、g the remand of Dennison, some progress will be made toward resolving those important problems. 不過，這句話的意思是什么不清楚，Graham表示命名這些專利權(quán)的有效性問題既沒有原因也沒有權(quán)威，在一般情況下，非顯而易性具體而言是作為“法律”（作為對比的“事實”）的。如下所示，沒有對這些事項的分析，它是很難確定專利是否有效的問題比專利的非顯而易見性的問題更應(yīng)被視為“法律”或在任何情況下應(yīng)該提供的什么樣的待遇。人們希望，隨著Dennison案件的發(fā)回重申，能夠取得一些進展，解決這些重要問題。 Whi

12、le much has been written on the law/fact dichotomy, a brief overview is in order. The terms, “l(fā)aw” and “fact” are used several ways, and it is necessary to define them in the present context. Approached that way, the term, “fact,” is more precisely called “adjudicative fact,” and the most accurate d

13、efinition is operational. In short, a question of adjudicative fact is one of the kind traditionally regarded as appropriate for juries. Conversely, a question of “l(fā)aw” is anything that remains — including questions of “l(fā)egislative” fact, the latter being used, even by courts, in conjunction with va

14、lues, to evolve general rules. 盡管很多案例已經(jīng)被寫進了法律/事實二分法，下面就來一個簡單的介紹。法律術(shù)語“法律”和“事實”被用于若干方面，在目前的情況下，我們有必要去給這個兩個術(shù)語下定義。專業(yè)術(shù)語“事實”，更精確地應(yīng)該被稱為“裁決的事實”，而這個最準確的定義具有可操作性?？傊?，事實問題的裁決歷來是陪審團認為比較合適的裁判種類之一。相反， “法律”問題則是被遺留的問題——包括“立法”事實問題，它甚至被法院使用并與價值相結(jié)合后，演變成一般規(guī)則。 The closest one can come to avoiding circularity is to look

15、 at whether a fact is critical only to the outcome of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the classes of which the parties are merely members. See generally, e.g., B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 213-16 (2d Ed. 1984). 最接近的一次可以用來避免循環(huán)是看事實是否只對具體糾紛的結(jié)果，或只是去建立階級中少數(shù)成員的權(quán)利

16、和義務(wù)。一般見，例如，B. Schwartz行政法，16卷213頁（1984年第二版）。 Unfortunately, the water is muddied when courts occasionally resolve fact issues as a“matter of law.” Yet, even then, the operational definition stands: If a matter is sufficiently well established in the record that reasonable minds could not differ, it

17、 is within the ultimate control of judges, not a jury. Hence, in sorting out “l(fā)aw” and “fact” issues, roles of judge and jury are paramount. 不幸的是，在法院偶然的一次將事實問題當做判例法來解決后水還是被攪渾了。然而，即使如此，在操作上它就定義為：如果一個事件被充分地記錄了但是合理的分析又不能將它辨別，那么只有法官有最終控制權(quán)，而不是陪審團。因此，在對“法律”和“事實”問題進行分類時，法官和陪審團的角色是至關(guān)重要的。 Indeed, this is

18、inherent in rights to jury trials; without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. While appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact properly entrusted to juries are entitled to exceptional deference under th

19、e “substantial evidence” standard. 事實上，這是陪審團的固有權(quán)利；沒有這些區(qū)別，陪審團的這一權(quán)利就是被架空的，上訴法官和審判法官也一樣。雖然上訴法院可能是法律問題的最終仲裁者，但是為了表示特殊的敬意，法院通常會在有大量充足的證據(jù)情況下的將事實案件妥善地交給陪審團。由于某些不同的原因，事實的裁決范圍要被擴大，就像在Dennison案件中法官的審判，有“明顯錯誤”的審查適用。 For somewhat different reasons, deference to fact finding is also extended, as in Dennison,

20、to bench trials. There “clearly erroneous” review applies. That standard is less deferential, but the Supreme Court demonstrated in Dennison, and more so in Inwood Laboratories more than token deference is required. 該標準是不那么恭敬，但最高法院在Dennison案件表現(xiàn)出來的，以及在Inwood實驗室案件中說明超過象征性的尊重是必需的。 Until 1985, the de

21、pth of review sometimes varied depending on whether cases turned on demeanor or documentary evidence. The latter had sometimes been accorded less deference.直到1985年，審查的深度有時視乎案件的行為或書面證據(jù)而不等。后者有時不被給予尊重。 The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings... based s

22、olely on documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule but, in explaining the change made that year, the Advisory Committee said: These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the

23、appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and

24、 needlessly reallocate judicial authority. 主要論點有利于推進搜索上訴審查結(jié)果...純粹證據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)是，規(guī)則的理由，但是，在解釋改變這一年，咨詢委員會說：這些考慮公眾輿論的和司法經(jīng)濟會被審判法庭，而不是上訴法庭要允許上訴法院……。更加積極地分享實況調(diào)查功能往往會破壞在當事人的心目中的區(qū)法院的合法性，一些事實問題的上訴重審案件將會速度增加，司法權(quán)威將會不必要的重新分配。 “Constitutional Facts” “憲法事實” Despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially

25、 before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give above-average scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at stake.Indeed, the Supreme Court held exactly that in Bose Corp v. Consumers Union U.S. While the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not p

26、atents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. 盡管如此，也不管是否事實發(fā)生在審判前，在危急時刻憲法關(guān)注的一項爭議可以使法院給予高于平均水平的審查。事實上，最高法院認為正是在Bose公司訴美國消費者聯(lián)盟案件，雖然決定有關(guān)于言論自由和詆毀產(chǎn)品，而不是專利，適度延伸審查范圍會對后者產(chǎn)生重大影響。 In Bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to exercise independent judgment in determini

27、ng when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the other’s products. One commentator has argued that the Court’s reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. He also urges that deep review

28、 of constitutional facts is compelling when they have been found by administrative agencies. 在Bose案件中，有人認為，上訴法院有責任決定當一方應(yīng)該對另外乙方的非事實描述信任的時候獨立裁判（在此種情況下，與“意見”相反的東西）。一位評論家認為，法院的自由裁量難以限制的第一修正案。他還對當一項憲法事實被行政機關(guān)發(fā)現(xiàn)時它的審查深度時候可信度表示懷疑。 Consider whether findings that deal with patent validity do not fit in

29、either instance. At least when no new art is introduced in the litigation, a challenge to validity involves not only issues of constitutional interest (Art. I 8 cl. 8) but also a collateral challenge to findings of the Patent and Trademark Office. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court had occasion

30、to consider the implications of this. Yet, it may well have had Bose (perhaps unconsciously) in mind when it remanded Dennison. If the CAFC, or ultimately the Supreme Court, believes that extraordinary review of facts in patent cases is warranted, consideration should be given to whether the “consti

31、tutional fact” doctrine might be usefully extended. Patent attorneys are fond of referring to the constitutional underpinnings of the patent system. Yet rarely will a case turn on them, and it is doubtful that any Supreme Court validity decision ever did. 考慮專利的有效性不適合其他任何實例的結(jié)果是否成立。至少在沒有新的發(fā)現(xiàn)在訴訟中出現(xiàn)，對

32、涉及的有效性提出挑戰(zhàn)，不僅憲法利益的問題（第一條第8款第8項），也是一個對于專利和商標是局的調(diào)查結(jié)果的變相挑戰(zhàn)。這是令人懷疑的是，最高法院有機會考慮有關(guān)的影響。然而，在考慮Dennison 案件是很可能有Bose公司（也許不自覺地）在潛意識里。如果美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院，或者最高法院認為，在專利案件事實的特殊審查是非常必要的，應(yīng)考慮 “憲制上的事實”學(xué)說是否可能是有益的延長。專利代理人喜歡專利制度的憲法基礎(chǔ)這一理論。然而，很少有案件會轉(zhuǎn)移到這方面來，任何最高法院所作出的有效性裁決都是值得懷疑的。 Even an 1850 case often regarded as the genesis o

33、f the nonobviousness requirement was not based on the Constitution. On the contrary, notwithstanding a dissent claiming otherwise, Justice Nelson did not admit to adding a new requirement — much less one mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, he insisted that mere novelty, even coupled with market su

34、ccess, had long been inadequate to support patent validity. 即使是1850年的情況通常認為非顯而易見性的要求不是以憲法為依據(jù)的。相反，盡管聲稱異議，法官納爾遜不承認加入了新的要求——更不用說一個由憲法規(guī)定的。事實上，他堅持認為，單純的新穎性，即使加上市場的成功，早已不足以支持專利的有效性。 The first Supreme Court allusion to constitutional interests being involved in standards of patentability does not seem t

35、o have occurred until the 1950 — almost exactly a century later. Moreover, it arose in the context of the Court’s addressing the scope of appellate review in patent cases. While it had a rule against re-examining findings consistently made by two lower courts, the Court nevertheless found the patent

36、 invalid. The majority maintained, however, that it was reversing because the wrong legal standard had been applied. 第一最高法院針對憲法的利益被參與到專利標準的事實似乎并未有發(fā)生，直到1950年 - 幾乎整整一個世紀之后。此外，在它的背景下出現(xiàn)了法院在處理在專利案件上訴時規(guī)定了審查范圍。雖然它必須有兩個下級法院進行結(jié)果檢查規(guī)定，但法院從來沒有判定專利無效。然而大多數(shù)人認為，這是因為錯誤的法律標準的應(yīng)用。 The most noteworthy aspect of that

37、case, for present purposes, is a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. There, it was argued that the majority would have been justified in reversing, notwithstanding the two-court rule. He reasoned that validity is a question of law because “The standard of patentability is a constitutional standar

38、d; and the question of validity is a question of law.” For authority he cited Mahn v.Harwood, an 1884 case in which the Court reviewed a decision of the Patent Commissioner. Yet, Mahn merely points out that, while the Commissioner might be entitled to some deference on questions of fact, courts need

39、 not defer on questions of law— hardly an earth-shaking proposition. 在那種情況下對于當前的目的最值得注意的方面，就是讓大法官Douglas贊成這個意見。在那里，有人認為，多數(shù)是可以扭轉(zhuǎn)，盡管有兩法庭規(guī)則。他的理由是有效性是法律的問題，因為他說：“專利標準是憲法標準;以及有效性問題是一個法律問題?！睂τ跈?quán)威，他引用Mahn v.Harwood在1884年審判的一個案件中，法院審查了專利專員的決定。然而，Mahn 只指出，雖然可能專利專員過度尊重事實問題，但是法院不必在這個法律問題上推遲——因為這根本就不是什么驚天動地的問題

40、。 Had Graham cited Justice Douglas’ opinion in A&P, it would have been helpful in understanding what was meant by calling validity a question of law. Nevertheless, the explicit constitutional origins of the patent system, perhaps coupled with the fact that validity may involve collateral review of

41、 administrative action, could serve as a basis for de novo review of questions of fact. Whether the constitutional fact doctrine or anything else should be used to that end, however, is another question. Before attending to it, a closer examination of nonobviousness may be useful. 如果Graham引述司法部Doug

42、las在A＆P公司的觀點，這將對理解什么是調(diào)用法律效力問題是有幫助的。然而，憲法明確了專利制度的起源，也許事實有效性可能涉及抵押品的行政行為的審查，可以作為一個從頭對事實問題審查的基礎(chǔ)上加上。但是，無論在憲法或其他任何學(xué)說應(yīng)當用于這一目的，就轉(zhuǎn)變成了另外一個問題。在致力于這個事實之前，對非顯而易見性更仔細的考察可能是有用的。 Is Nonobviousness a Special Case? 非顯而易見性是一個特殊的情形嗎？ Whatever the CAFC decides about the appropriate standard of review for nonobvious

43、ness, it ought also to address why that standard should differ from that applied to other validity requirements. While nonobviousness was the primary concern in Graham and companion cases, that decision calls validity a question of law. If the CAFC chooses to single out nonobviousness for special tr

44、eatment, it should justify it’s approach. 無論聯(lián)邦巡回法院決定為非顯而易見性決定適當?shù)膶彶闃藴?，它?yīng)該也能解釋為何該標準應(yīng)有所區(qū)別于應(yīng)用到其他的有效性要求。雖然非顯而易見性是在Graham案件和同樣的案件中的主要關(guān)注點，該決定被稱為一個法律問題的有效性。如果聯(lián)邦巡回法院選擇對非顯而易見性進行特殊待遇，應(yīng)該證明它的做法。 It might do so based on the origins of the nonobviousness requirement. Yet, even if nonobviousness had been found in

45、 Hotchkiss to be constitutionally mandated, an implicit requirement would hardly be more important than the utility requirement, which is about as explicit as the Constitution gets. Thus, even if the “constitutional fact” doctrine were used to justify more appellate review, nonobviousness would not

46、stand out. 也許這樣做是基于非顯而易見性要求的起源。然而，然而,盡管非顯而易見性已經(jīng)被發(fā)現(xiàn)在Hotchkiss是具有憲法，一個隱含要求將很難超過與憲法同樣明晰的實用要求。因此，即使是“憲法事實”學(xué)說被用于辯護更多的上訴評審，非顯而易見性也不會脫穎而出。 The CAFC might also attempt to distinguish nonobviousness on the basis of its technical difficulty and the tendency of fact finders to see inventions as obvious throu

47、gh hindsight. Still, neither that nor the tendency to Monday-morning quarterback should any more justify extraordinary appellate review than it would justify withholding nonobviousness (or, for that matter, medical malpractice) from the jury altogether. 美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院也可能試圖在技術(shù)難度和事實發(fā)現(xiàn)者在看到事后明顯的虛構(gòu)物時的傾向基礎(chǔ)上，分辨

48、非顯而易見性。不過，既不是那樣，也不是有放馬后炮傾向的人可能再替特別上訴評審辯護會而不是替來自陪審團隱瞞的非顯而易見性辯護（或與此有關(guān)的醫(yī)療事故）。 The Bottom Line 例外情況 The CAFC has full control of issues of patent law, subject only to legislative and Supreme Court oversight. When reviewing infringement litigation, whether there is a jury or not, it has the capacity,

49、for example, to correct for the application of erroneous legal standards, to expand the application of principles, or to carve out exceptions to rules. 根據(jù)最高人民法院的立法和監(jiān)督，美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院有專利法的完全控制權(quán)。在審查侵權(quán)訴訟時，無論有沒有陪審團，它有能力改正錯誤法律標準的應(yīng)用，擴大原則的應(yīng)用，或開拓出規(guī)則的例外。 It can also correct clear errors of fact. Its power is even

50、 greater where no jury is involved. Yet, regardless of the standard of review, it cannot second-guess the resolution of disputes that turn on the relative credibility of witnesses. If a case turns on credibility, it is difficult to justify reversal. That would leave trial courts and the bar guessing

51、. 它也可以糾正事實的清楚錯誤。如果沒有陪審團參與，它就有更大的權(quán)利。然而，忽略審查標準，它不能依賴證人相對可靠性來猜測糾紛的解決。如果一個案件轉(zhuǎn)向可靠，這就難以解釋逆轉(zhuǎn)。這將猜想留給了審判法庭和法庭欄桿了。 If closer review of certain issues of fact seems justified notwithstanding, e.g., problems with demeanor evidence, perhaps on the basis of (often correct) judicial intuition, it behooves the C

52、AFC to confront the issue squarely. It could turn out, on closer inspection, that such review is unwarranted or, if warranted, falls within a recognized exception. It is possible, too, that a new theory may need to be evolved to explain a new exception. The worst that could happen would be to fail t

53、o deal with the issue head on. That would leave trial courts and the bar guessing.It would also seem to encourage unduly the inefficient practice of relitigating issues in a setting which would not have been appropriate for dealing with them in the first instance. 如果事實的必然爭論點的近一步評審似乎審查得很有道理，例如，風范證據(jù)

54、的問題，可能在司法直覺（通常是正確的）的基礎(chǔ)上，理當由美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院直接面對問題。仔細觀察后，可能發(fā)現(xiàn)這種審查是毫無根據(jù)的，或者落在了一個公認的例外范圍。這也是可能的，同樣，一個新的理論可能需要發(fā)展才能解釋一個新例外。最壞的情況也將無法處理這個問題。這將猜測留給了審判法庭和酒吧.這也似乎在過度鼓勵無效練習(xí)將不會被第一時間處理。 Should review more intensive than permitted under Rule 52(a) be somehow justified for fact disputes underlying one or more validity r

55、equirements, calling them issues of “l(fā)aw” changes nothing and merely confuses matters. Hence, the “constitutional fact” doctrine deserves close attention. It would highlight the need for intense appellate review without concealing the essential nature of the issue; in short, it would serve the needs

56、 of both form and function. 應(yīng)該更深入的檢討而不是允許在第52（a）條法令下事實質(zhì)疑隱含一個或多個有效要求合法化，稱他們的問題“法律”沒有什么變化，只是混淆問題。因此，“憲法事實”原則值得密切注意。這將強調(diào)強烈上訴審判的需要沒有隱藏問題的本質(zhì),簡言之,這將滿足形式和功能的雙重需要。 Regardless of the outcome, everyone should appreciate an honest attempt to grapple with an issue in limbo far too long. In Dennison, the CAFC has an opportunity to shape the very foundations of patent litigation. It is to be hoped that the court will rise to the occasion. 無論結(jié)果如何，每個人都應(yīng)該明白一個誠實的嘗試拼一明朗的問題太長。在Dennison，美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院是有機會塑造這個專利訴訟的基礎(chǔ)。人們希望法院會振作起來。